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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
It is questionable whether this trend of expanding the scope
of judicial review of fact determinations is actually desirable. Ad-
mittedly the right of appeal is essential as a check on administra-
tive findings, but certain practical and policy considerations should
not be overlooked in an overzealous desire to provide justice. Many
administrative bodies are better qualified than the courts to find the
facts in their particular field; also it is they who confront the wit-
nesses and hear the testimony. Particularly is this true in the case of
federal boards and commissions, such as the National Labor Rela-
tions Board and the Federal Trade Commission. As a matter of policy
our administrative agencies will be relegated to uselessness if some
degree of finality is not conferred upon their factual determinations.
I believe that the substantial evidence test is a sound approach
to the present problem of review. However, the test in its present
form will remain necessary only so long as our administrative bodies
remain at a low level of competency. When and if such agencies
achieve a high degree of competency this trend towards liberal
review should subside and the real problem will have found solution.
J. O. F.
CONSTrTUTONAL LAW-FmEEOM OF SPEECa-i-OtiNANCE RE-
QUIRING BEGISTRATION OF UNION ORGANizERs HELD VioLAv.-D,
a salaried labor organizer, went to the town of Baxley, Georgia, and
there solicited membership in a union without first obtaining a
"license" as provided by a city ordinance. D was arrested and tried
by city officials under authority of the ordinance for soliciting
without the license, she was convicted and a fine and imprisonment
were imposed. The superior court of the county affirmed the con-
viction, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the superior
court and the supreme court of the state denied certiorari. D ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. Held, the ordi-
nance of the town of Baxley, prohibiting solicitation of members for
an organization without a permit -and making it discretionary with
the mayor and city council as to whether to grant a permit, with-
out any definitive standards or other controlling guides, is invalid as
abridging the guaranty of freedom of speech as secured by the
Constitution of the United States. Staub v. City of Baxley, 78 Sup.
Ct. 277 (1958).
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It has been consistently held that any state statute or city ordi-
nance which makes the enjoyment of a constitutionally guaranteed
freedom dependent upon the discretion of a public official, is
void. Kunz v. State of New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (discretionary
power in administrative official to control in advance the right of
citizens to speak on religious matters on the public street); Schneider
v. State of New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1940)
(discretion in chief of police to ban the advocacy of any cause from
door to door); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (discretion in
chief of police whether to grant a permit for the leasing of a hall
for a public speech or holding public meetings).
Aside from the constitutional aspect of discretionary control,
such control has been held to be in conflict with the National Labor
Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935) as amended 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1952), in cases involving union business agents who act as solici-
tors. That act's purpose was to encourage collective bargaining and
to protect the fall freedom of workers in the selection of bargaining
representatives. Thus, to allow a chosen representative to be dis-
qualified by a governmental official would, in effect, substitute
the state's judgment for that of the workers in selecting their bar-
gaining representatives. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
Not all regulations of solicitation are open to constitutional
objection, if such is affected with a public interest and involves no
subjective test or discretionary control. Breard v. Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 810 U.S. 296 (1940).
Several economic and commercial fields have been regulated for
many years, and the constitutionality of such regulations has re-
peatedly been upheld. Banks are required to incorporate, Shallin-
berger v. First State Bank, 219 U.S. 114 (1911); insurance agents
are required to obtain licenses, German Alliance Insurance Co. v.
Lawes, 233 U.S. 389 (1914); individuals engaging in occupations
requiring a standard of skill may be forced to obtain a permit. Dent
v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
The Court in the principal case held the ordinance invalid as
abridging the guaranty of freedom of speech because it made the
right of one to solicit members for an organization depend upon
the uncontrolled will of an official, expressly stating in the margin
that the Court was not confronted with any question concerning the
right of the city to regulate the pursuit of an occupation. In so
holding it left unanswered one important question; are union
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organizers subject to reasonable state regulation? Some insight
may be had to this question by considering whether the activity
of an organizer for a labor union is a routine business matter, hence
subject to regulation, Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritters Cafe,
315 U.S. 722 (1942), or of such nature as to bring it under the pro-
tection of the free speech guaranty, which the state is forbidden to
abridge. Near v. Minnesota, 288 U.S. 297 (1981).
In the case of Thomas v. Collins, 328 U.S. 516 (1945), it was
held that an act which required the obtaining of a permit before
any solicitation could be made, which was so broad as to apply
to public speeches by way of a prior restraint, was invalid as ap-
plied to a solicitation for union membership contained in a public
speech given before assembled employees. The act was not de-
clared unconstitutional on its face and the Court intimated that
some control would be valid if reasonably applied by stating at
page 540: "Once the speaker goes further . . . and engages in
conduct which amounts to more than the right of free speech com-
prehends, as when he undertakes the collection of funds or securing
subscriptions, he enters a realm where a reasonable registration of
identification requirement may be imposed." Under this holding it
would seem that an organizer is given a "dual" role in respect to
his different activities, one in which he makes speeches in public
in which he solicits great numbers of persons for his organization;
the other where he makes private contacts, soliciting persons indi-
vidually, in behalf of his organization, for funds or subscriptions. In
the former he must not be regulated, in the latter some regulation
is valid if reasonably applied. But where is the dividing line be-
tween his exercise of free speech and his acting in purely a com-
mercial nature? The Court here did not draw the line but simply
said that the act was beyond it. It might be well to note, however,
that the registration requirement involved in the Thomas case has
since been applied to labor organizers' solicitations made "otherwise
than as _part of a public speech. . . ." AFL v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d
276, 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). Also similar requirements have
been applied to union business agents. Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F.
Supp. 51 (D. Kan. 1945).
With no specific guide lines, nor a pronouncement by the
Court as to what extent a state may regulate union organizers, it
would seem that any attempt to so regulate them would meet with
either constitutional barriers, U.S. CoNsT. amend. I, or federal legis-
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lative barriers, National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952). But there seems to be no
valid reason for giving immunity to labor organizers, although it
is true that some of their activities are in their very nature within
the guaranty of freedom of speech as being a concrete expression
of a social ideal, namely unionism. Even so, it is well to remember
that unionism is also big business. Then too, the activities of a
union organizer are not always above reproach and may create a
vital community concern. For example he may use force or threats
of force against employees who refuse to join the union, or he might
commit acts of violence, or cause such acts to be committed in an
otherwise peaceful picket line. See NLRB v. Local 140, United
Furniture Workers, CIO, 233 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1956). Perhaps if
the organizer were required to make his presence known through a
reasonable registration requirement then such activities would be
curtailed or at least be less frequent because the notoriety given to
his presence would lessen the effects of his actions.
It is submitted that a state does have a substantial interest in
the protection of its citizens inasmuch as it has the right to protect
them from being defrauded or otherwise harmed by any form of
solicitation; and a requirement of registration of labor organizers,
absent any discretionary feature which does not prohibit the expres-
sion of social ideas whether they be unionism or whatever, should
be allowed without objection. It is sincerely felt that our concept of
free speech will lose nothing for such regulation, but on the contrary
a valuable function of the state police power will not be thwarted.
J. L. R.
CoNsTrrumoNAL LAw-TAXATiON OF INTErSTATE Comm~nvcE--
RAmoAD Loop TAImc.-P railroad originates in Virginia and
passes through West Virginia, with two loop deviations into Virginia
and Kentucky totaling six miles. P is taxed for the privilege of doing
business in West Virginia on the basis of a percentage of its property
within the state, as well as on a percentage of its net income earned
within the state. W. VA. CODE c. 11, art. 12a, § § 2 and 5b (Michie
1955). In a declaratory judgment action, P contended that the loop
traffic should be considered in determining whether such tax con-
stituted a direct burden upon the interstate business of P. D de-
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